Whitlamʼs Shifts in Foreign Policy 1972-1975: Israel and Soviet Jewry, Professor Emerita Suzanne D Rutland OAM, Australian Jewish Historical Society Journal 2015 Volume 22 Part 2

Abstract

When Gough Whitlam’s Labor Party was elected to government of the Commonwealth of Australia in December 1972, Whitlam sought to completely change the direction of Australia’s foreign policy, moving from the United States’ orbit towards that of the Communist and Third World powers. This change of direction affected his policies towards both Israel and the campaign for Soviet Jewry for freedom of migration. Chanan Reich has discussed the Whitlam government’s change of policy direction viz-a-viz Israel. However, it is also necessary to examine his policies in relation to Soviet Jewry, and issues of lobby groups in Australia. This is seen most clearly in his constant criticism of the “Jewish lobby” and his strong support for the “Arab lobby,” highlighted both in his discussions with Soviet representatives before his visit to the Soviet Union (the first by an Australian Prime Minister) and in his private correspondence with Lebanese born Australian businessman, Reuben F. Scarf. Whitlam’s change of direction towards the Soviet and Arab world was motivated by a number of different factors: ideological considerations in foreign policy; electoral issues, with the growing Arab population in Australia; the influence of left-wing members of the Australian Labor Party (ALP), such as Bill Hartley; and financial imperatives of the Party.

Whitlam’s Foreign Policy

In December 1972, the ALP was elected to power after 23 years in the political wilderness. Gough Whitlam’s tenure lasted for less than three years and was a time of political turmoil. He was forced to go to an election in 1974, before completing his first term of office, and he was dismissed by the Governor General, Sir John Kerr on 11 November 1975, which led to a double dissolution federal election on 13 December 1975, when Whitlam’s Labor Party was roundly Australian Journal of Jewish Studies (2012) 26: 36 – 69 defeated. In addition to his role as Prime Minister, Whitlam initially assumed the role of Minister for Foreign Affairs. At this time Whitlam opened a new chapter in Australian diplomatic history, where he “shook up Australia’s diplomatic provincialism” (Elizur 2000). He introduced radical changes in Australian foreign policy that also affected domestic policy. Senator Don Willesee, who took over Foreign Affairs from Whitlam in 1974, continued to follow these policies. Whitlam’s biographer, Jenny Hocking (2012: 122), noted that in regard to the new perspectives in foreign policy, this was “a record that more than any other was of his own making, one of which he was justifiably proud”.

Whitlam wished to chart a more independent Australian foreign policy, stressing immediately after his election that “the change in government does provide a new opportunity for us to reassess a whole range of Australian foreign policies and attitudes” (Hocking 2012: 21). From the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941 until the 1970s, Australia moved from seeing Britain as her key protector to placing her reliance on the United States. This change was formalised with the signing of two treaties: the Security Treaty of Australia, New Zealand and United States (ANZUS) and the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). Throughout this period, there was strong cooperation between the two countries, with the United States establishing military bases in Australia, and Australia supporting the United States in the United Nations. The peak of this policy came in 1967 during President Johnson’s visit to Australia when Prime Minister Harold Holt declared “All the way with LBJ”1 in relation to the Vietnam War (Pemberton 1997). In contrast, the Labor Party strongly opposed Australian participation in Vietnam.

When Whitlam was elected to power in December 1972, the Soviet press wrote laudatory comments supporting his election, and this continued during his tenure, although they were critical of Australia for maintaining the American military bases, and also remaining a member of SEATO.2 Whitlam formally recognised Communist China, ended all Australian involvement with the Vietnam War, rejected the concept of “forward defence” and took a strong stand against apartheid South Africa (Reynolds 1997). One of his first steps after the Labor victory in December 1972 was to break ranks with Portugal, France, the United States, and the United Kingdom when, for the first time, “Australia voted in favour of resolutions on the right of peoples to self-determination and the granting of independence to colonial nations” (Hocking 2012: 21). Whitlam later wrote to the United Nations Secretary-General, stressing the new Australian position supporting the UN in its efforts “to bring an end to the illegal minority regime in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and accordingly will strongly enforce sanctions imposed on it” (Hocking 2012:21).

In this way, he overturned the previous Liberal Government’s policy, a change which the Australian delegation to the UN strongly supported (Hocking 2012:21). He was the first Australian Prime Minister to undertake official visits to both Communist China and the Soviet Union. Whitlam also focused more on Australia’s interests in the Asia-Pacific region and sought to build bridges with developing countries by moving away from Australian reliance on the United States (Hocking 2012: 56).

He believed strongly in the importance of the United Nations, and in 1974 was the first Australian Prime Minister to address the UN General Assembly. He began by referring to the key role played by Dr Herbert Vere Evatt, former Labor Minister for External Affairs, in the drafting of the UN Charter in 1945, becoming very emotional when he spoke about Evatt’s role. During his address, he stressed Australia’s support of postcolonial independence and the interconnection of all nations, stating that “we are all internationals now” (Hocking 2012: 189). In addition, he officially ended Australia’s White Australia policy, allowing Asian immigrants into Australia, and began to foster multiculturalism.

In his autobiography, Whitlam argued that he initiated a new approach to Australian foreign policy from the anti-Communist approach of his predecessors (Whitlam 1985: 25-181). F. Rawdon Dalrymple, who had been Australia’s Ambassador to Israel during the Whitlam era, has suggested that Whitlam’s decision to recognise Communist China and to strengthen connections with the Soviet Union emerged from his support for the socialist welfare state ideal, rather than a particular attraction to Communism. Furthermore, many of his generation linked a sympathy to the welfare state ideal to a wider sympathy with the Soviet Union and the Russian people, which was generated by their role in the defeat of Nazi Germany, and the fact that the Soviet Union had lost many more of its citizens than had any other state during World War II.3

There is significant scholarly debate as to the extent that Whitlam chartered a different foreign and economic policy from his Liberal predecessors. In his chapter on “Whitlam and the Labor Tradition”, Gregory Pemberton outlines this debate. He points out that contemporary conservative critics claimed that Whitlam moved significantly “from the long-established principles of the Coalition” (Pemberton 1997: 131). He highlights Dean Jaensch’s assertion that Whitlam did introduce a new policy which was in keeping with the Labor tradition established during the Evatt period, but was later to be negated by the right-wing approach of the Hawke-Keating Government (Jaensch 1989). However, most of this debate focused on economic issues, rather than foreign policy (Pemberton 1997: 134).

Pemberton outlined a number of features which he saw as specific to the Labor tradition in foreign affairs:

(1) Labor’s assertion of a more independent policy;

(2) the party’s greater emphasis on the Asia Pacific region;

(3) emphasis on the role of the United Nations;

(4) support for decolonisation;

(5) emphasis on peaceful methods;

(6) belief in government external policies to introduce economic change; and

(7) a more inclusive attitude towards the local Australian population.

He quotes Whitlam’s first speech to Parliament: Our thinking is towards a more independent Australian stance in international affairs and towards an Australia which will be less militarily oriented and not open to suggestions of racism; an Australia which will enjoy a growing standing as a distinctive, tolerant, cooperative and well regarded nation not only in the Asian and Pacific region but in the world at large (Pemberton 1997: 136).

In a careful analysis of Whitlam’s foreign policy, Pemberton demonstrates how he did introduce significant changes in keeping with the first five points on his list above. Pemberton argues that until the release of government documents, it would not be possible to make any assertions about his last two points. In contrast, Hocking argued Suzanne D. Rutland 39 in her biography of Whitlam that he still saw Australia as part of the Western alliance, but that he wanted to expand her connections, although this was not the way his policies were perceived, especially by the Americans (Hocking 2012: 91-93). This article will support Pemberton’s argument and will posit that, as part of his changes in foreign policy, Whitlam changed Australia’s level of support for Israel and distanced himself from the local Jewish community, and the campaign for Soviet Jewry.

Changing Policies towards Israel and the Middle East

In regard to the Middle East, Whitlam repeatedly claimed that he was maintaining “the fine balance” between Israel and the Arab World established by his predecessors through his policy of “even handedness”. He had a good working knowledge of Israel, which he had visited in 1964 and 1966. In August 1967, he criticised the Holt government for failing to facilitate post and air connections with Israel due to pressure from the Arab governments, and at the time of the 1967 war and subsequently, made statements supportive of Israel (Reich 2002 and 2010). Later, as Prime Minister, he established a Trade Commission in Tel Aviv and claimed that he had hoped to arrange rights for Qantas, but did not succeed because its management opposed the idea for commercial reasons.4

During the 1972 elections, issues relating to the Middle East were not raised (Fleischer and Rubenstein 2007). After his election, he stated that he planned to continue the traditional support for Israel. However, within the context of his foreign policy changes, Whitlam sought to modify the previous Liberal pro-Israel policy to one of neutrality, which at times leaned towards the Arab position. This may have been as a result of his visits to Lebanon in 1968 and 1971 when he “became increasingly aware of the sufferings of the Palestinian people and the attitudes of the other Arab nations” (Whitlam 1985: 124). Whitlam’s distancing of his government from support of Israel manifested itself in United Nations voting patterns, policies during the 1973 war and its aftermath, moves to establish an Arab League Office in Australia, establishing contacts with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), and permitting its representatives to visit Australia (Encel 2004).

During 1973 Australia was a non-permanent member of the Security Council, represented by Sir Laurence McIntyre, who had a personal history of being less pro-Israel than the Liberal Government in the 1960s, even though in the end he had to follow instructions from the government of the day. Thus, after the 1967 war, McIntyre supported the Arab position, advocating that Israel withdraw from the conquered territories, in return for an implied Arab recognition of Israel’s right to exist. However, McIntyre’s position was opposed by the then Minister for External Affairs, Paul Hasluck, who believed that Israel and the Arab countries should negotiate over the new boundaries and instructed McIntyre to prepare Australia’s statement along those lines for the UN General Assembly’s debate after the war (Reich 2002: 114). Following this and Australia’s opposition to the anti- Israel Yugoslav resolution calling on Israel to withdraw unconditionally to its positions before 5 June, Israel’s representative at the UN, Abba Ebban, described the Australian officials as “endemically pro-Israel” (Reich 2002: 114).

Under Whitlam, the situation was different with Australia supporting a position critical of Israel during some of the UN debates. In April 1973 Israel retaliated against PLO bases in Lebanon in response to a terrorist attack on its northern border town, Kiryat Shmona. McIntrye voted in support of a resolution that condemned Israel, after a Security Council amendment to condemn both sides was defeated. In July 1973 Australia voted in support of Israel, taking the position that there could be no peace in the Middle East until the Arabs recognised Israeli sovereignty, but in August 1973, Australia again supported what the Jewish community saw as a “one-sided resolution in the Security Council”, which was vetoed by the United States.5 Throughout 1973, Whitlam’s public statements emphasised the importance of the Security Council and its key peacekeeping role.

During the month of October, McIntyre chaired the Security Council and was in a position to influence developments. In October 1973 during the fast of Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar when everything comes to a stop in Israel, Israel was attacked by Egypt and Syria. The war lasted for three weeks. Whitlam refused to condemn the Arabs for initiating the war, taking the line of argument that Israel shared responsibility because of its continued occupation of land conquered during the 1967 war. However, while he did not criticise the Soviet Union for supplying arms to the Arab states, he immediately condemned the United States when Suzanne D. Rutland 41 Nixon commenced providing Israel with military assistance.6 He also refused Israeli Ambassador Moshe Erell’s request for the Government to supply 18 Australian Mirage jets to Israel (Whitlam 1985: 125).

Subsequently defending his policies, Whitlam argued that Australia was “neutral and even-handed” in its approach, although he reaffirmed Australia’s support of Israel’s right to exist.7 He defended his position at a Press Club luncheon on 8 November 1973, explaining why he was not prepared to see Egypt as the aggressor and to condemn their initiation of the war. He also paid tribute to McIntyre’s contribution as chair of the Security Council and referred to the unresolved problem of the Palestinians.8 It is interesting to note that McIntyre served under the Liberals at the UN, but in relation to Israel his ideological point of view was more compatible with Whitlam than with Gorton. This was in contrast to departmental secretary, Sir Keith Waller, who did not advocate a strong policy position in terms of Israel and its conflict with its Arab neighbours (Pemberton 1997: 157).

In December 1973 Labor MHR Joe Berinson, who himself was Jewish, raised the question of Syrian treatment of captured Israeli soldiers. Whitlam stated that his government had made informal approaches to Syria, but he refused to initiate action in the United Nations against alleged Syrian war atrocities.9 At the same time, newly appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Don Willesee again reaffirmed the Government’s support of Israel’s right to exist.

The Whitlam Government combined its diplomatic rapprochement with the Communist world with negotiations with the Arab world in 1974 and 1975. On 15 October 1974 the United Nations voted to recognise the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Only four countries opposed this motion, with Australia deciding to abstain.10 Subsequent to this vote, the PLO was invited to address the 29th General Assembly on the Question of Palestine. Yigal Allon, the Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, wrote to Willesee requesting Australia to vote against PLO participation. Allon stated that the parliamentary situation at the General Assembly was such that, whatever the Arabs proposed, would be accepted. He asked Australia to oppose the resolution because her position was such that it carried “political and moral weight in the world”. Allon argued that an abstention would “only open the road to further pressure and further demands”.11 Despite this plea, Australia decided to abstain, even though most of the European powers joined the United States in voting against the invitation.12 Then, in November 1974, UNESCO voted to exclude Israel from its European Regional Group, effectively stripping it of membership of the organisation. Again, Australia did not support Israel, even though all Western European governments did.

In July 1975, the first International Women’s Conference was held in Mexico to inaugurate the UN Decade for Women. While the conference’s agenda was to focus on issues relating to discrimination against women, much of its time focused on political issues, including the Arab-Israeli conflict. A resolution was introduced stating that “Women, as well as men, should eliminate colonialism, neocolonialism, foreign domination and occupation, Zionism, apartheid [and] racial discrimination”. The Australian delegation at Mexico voted in support of this resolution.13

Another controversial issue was the proposal to establish an Arab League office in Australia, which would provide information about the plight of the Palestinians.14 The major advocate for this move was the prominent left-wing Victorian ALP executive member, Bill Hartley, who served as ALP secretary in the 1960s and 1970s (Encel 2004). In 1974, he facilitated the first Labor and Trade Union Delegation to the Middle East, when the group visited Egypt, Lebanon, Libya and Syria, with the aim of building political contacts with the Arab countries, establishing a relationship with the trade union movement and assessing the Palestinian Refugee problem.15 During this six-week tour of the Middle East the delegation met with PLO officials, including Yasser Arafat and returned advocating support of the Arab cause.

Many ALP members opposed the concept of establishing an Arab League Office. They included Joseph (Joe) Riordan and Barry Cohen, members of the House of Representatives, Don Dunstan, Premier of South Australia, NSW politician, Sydney Einfeld and Bob Hawke, the head of the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), who blasted Whitlam’s ALP policy towards Israel as “abhorrent and contrary to traditional Australian policies”.16

Media reactions were, on the whole, also negative. The editor of Suzanne D. Rutland 43 The Herald, Melbourne, wrote a very strong piece on 2 July 1974 entitled “Murder office not wanted,” stressing:

We know, above all, that Palestine “liberation” groups have proudly claimed responsibility for massacres at the Munich Olympics, the international airport at Tel Aviv, and in Khartoum, and for insane attacks on women and children in Northern Israel over the past two months. The Australian public does not need their likes here.

The Foreign Ministry rejected the argument about terrorism, stating that Arab League offices operated in other Western countries, but Hartley’s proposal created a dilemma for the Foreign Affairs officials. On the one hand, they were concerned that a refusal would impact on “our relations with the Arab world [especially Libya and Iraq], which we are seeking to develop”.17 On the other hand, they were also concerned that the move would affect Australia’s relations with Israel and would lead to her insisting on the establishment of a World Zionist Organisation office in Australia. In the end, no specific proposals were put forward and nothing eventuated.

In January 1975 Hartley, while on another visit to the Middle East, created further tensions by unofficially inviting PLO representatives to Australia. This invitation was strongly criticised by Hawke.18 As reported in the SMH, on 30 January 1975, following the rejection of all six premiers and ministerial opposition in Cabinet, Whitlam announced the Government’s refusal to grant visas to the PLO representatives. He reached this decision just before the Party convened for its annual conference in Terrigal, when he rebuked both Hawke and Hartley for creating divisions within the party.

In June 1975 a motion to grant the PLO observer status at the International Labour Organisation (ILO) was discussed. An amendment was introduced affirming the right of all member states to continue in existence, an obvious reference to Israel. When this amendment was defeated, the Australian Government delegation voted in favour of the PLO’s being granted observer status, unlike the two other Australian delegations representing workers and employers, which voted against the motion.19

Thus, by 1975 Whitlam had introduced a definite change in the Australian Government’s approach to Israel and Middle East policy. In 1974, an undated and unsigned confidential departmental memo analysed Australia’s pro-Israel policy over many years. It argued that there were four main reasons for this support:

• the widespread feeling in the main Australian political parties and in the community at large that the sufferings of the Jewish people entitled them to a national home, and that their right to the peaceful enjoyment of Israel was worthy of support;
• the political activity of the Jewish community in Australia;
• the belief that Israel had far more in common with Australia and its like-minded western friends than did the Arab states who were generally looked on as unstable, unreliable and backward;
• on the Israeli side, Australia was regarded as one of the states in which there was a favourable climate of opinion towards Israel, and it could generally be relied upon to take a not unsympathetic line towards Israel in relation to that country’s problems with its neighbours…20

The policy document noted that Whitlam changed Australia’s policy because of the post-1967 Israeli Government’s behaviour, which was seen as leading towards “a certain arrogance and intransigence”.21 The Labor Government believed that Israel’s refusal to withdraw from the occupied territories was the major obstacle to peace. In addition, economic factors played a role, including Australia’s wheat trade with Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries, and its civil aviation ties with Syria and Egypt. Another internal document stated:

Between the end of 1972 and early 1974, inter-governmental relations between Australia and Israel diminished. The inhibitions were on the Australian side. The drawing back from Israel reflected a desire on the part of the Australian Government to remould Australia’s foreign policy image and to draw closer politically and economically, to countries which were hostile to Israel. By early 1974, the drawing back from Israel had reached a point where the Australian Government, and its departments and agencies, tended to avoid the sorts of dealings which we would encourage and pursue with regard to most of the countries with which we have relations and which in no other cases, except perhaps those of South Africa and Chile, do we discourage.22

Soviet Jewry

Another major issue for world Jewry was the right of Soviet Jews to free migration. In November 1962, Australia was the first country to raise the issue of Soviet abuse of human rights, including the right of Jews to emigrate, in the United Nations. During the parliamentary debates preceding this move, major divisions emerged within the ALP over the level of antisemitism in the Soviet Union, in what became known as the “Sam Cohen Affair” (Mendes 2000 and Gouttman 1999). Throughout the 1960s, the Liberal/Country Party Government regularly raised the issue of Soviet Jewry, with John Gorton being strongly supportive as prime minister. However, Whitlam was to take a different approach.

Tensions between Whitlam and the Jewish community over Soviet Jewry started when he was leader of the Opposition. In September 1970 an Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ) delegation went to Canberra to press the cause of Soviet Jewry. During their meeting with Whitlam, he initially claimed that he had not heard about the difficulties faced by Soviet Jewry. After the Jewish delegation outlined the situation, he “exploded that the ‘Hawkes’ [an obvious reference to Bob Hawke, the chairman of the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU)] in the Government were busting themselves to curry favour and that the electorate of Phillip was the primary consideration” – Phillip being a Sydney electorate with a substantial Jewish population.23 Whitlam was also critical of the Gorton Government, claiming it was only using Soviet Jewry to “gain favour with the Jewish community”. Barry Cohen, an ALP member of the House of Representatives who attended this meeting, noted that he had a relative in the Soviet Union who was one of the signatories of the petition, which the ECAJ had prepared protesting at the treatment of Soviet Jewry.24 In the end, Whitlam agreed to raise the matter on a Socialist International level and he said he would also raise the matter with the Soviet Embassy.

In the early period of the Whitlam Years, two non-Jewish organisations raised this issue of Soviet Jewry. Immediately after Labor’s election, the Australian Council of Churches followed up on an earlier query relating to the tax imposed by the Soviet Government for the free university education Soviet Jews had received. This was known as a “ransom tax” because most Soviet Jews did not have the funds to pay it, making their departure almost impossible. This was followed by a request for action by the National Council of Women in Australia, which responded to a letter from the Council of Women’s Organisations in Israel, appealing to “women throughout the world to exert their influence on the Government of the U.S.S.R. to retract its policy of diploma ransom on Soviet Jews wishing to emigrate from the Soviet Union”.25 Whitlam responded:

I shall continue to take an active interest in this question. I understand however from recent press reports that the Soviet authorities have now announced significant revisions to the education tax regulations, which will have the effect of mitigating their impact. In these circumstances I do not think that this would be an appropriate time for the Australian Government to take up this matter with the Soviet Government).26

Subsequently under Whitlam, the Australian Government did not find an “appropriate time” to raise the matter of Soviet Jewry.

In October 1973 for United Nations Day, and again in December 1973, Whitlam gave major addresses in relation to human rights. In his December speech, he claimed that the record of his predecessors, the Liberal Party, was “one of negligence and inaction.” He enumerated the local initiatives his government had introduced, including the signing of the two United Nations Human Rights Covenants on civil and political rights and on economic social and cultural rights on 18 December 1972, which had remained unsigned from 1966, and the introduction of Bills dealing with Human Rights and Racial Discrimination. However, in his long and detailed speech, there was no mention of the abuse of human rights in the Soviet Union in general, or of the specific issue of Jewish emigration.27 When Whitlam did publicly raise the issue of Soviet abuse of human rights, such as during a speech he gave in September 1973, he referred only to the dissidents and not to the issue of Soviet Jewry.28

From 1970, the Soviet Government began to permit Jews to leave the Soviet Union on the basis of family reunion in Israel, their historic homeland. Between 1968 and 1972, a total of 50,000 Jews received exit visas from the Soviet Union; in 1973 another 35,000 were permitted to leave. In March 1973 the Australian Ambassador to Israel, F. Rawdon Dalrymple, provided a detailed report of a conversation he Suzanne D. Rutland 47 had with Mr Peled, Israel’s Minister for Immigration. Dalrymple wrote: “They know what the Russians are doing is unprecedented”, but that Peled was not quite sure the reasons for this. He noted that permitting so many Jews to emigrate could be due to internal factors; to the impact of world pressure; and most importantly to the United States legislature in relation to the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status. He further noted that Israel “does not want to appear too dependent on the United States — hence representations from other countries, including Australia, are very important.” Peled also made a brief reference to Arab pressure to prevent Soviet Jews immigrating to Israel but noted that the Russians pointed out that the Arab countries “allowed their Jewish population to emigrate to Israel”.29 The departmental reply particularly picked up on the last point in regard to Arab protests, stating that this was “interesting”.30

In March 1973, the Israeli ambassador, Moshe Erell, appealed to the Australian Government to raise the issue of Soviet Jewry during the visit of the Soviet Minister for Foreign Trade, Mr Patolichev, to Australia. Erell stressed that it was important to raise the matter, or “he would return to Moscow and say that a change of policy had taken place in Australia since last year’s election.” The former Prime Minister, William McMahon, had raised the matter with both the Soviet Ambassador in Australia and with Gromyko in New York, and Erell was sure that Patolichev would be conversant with this. A departmental memo suggested that the matter could be mentioned “unabrasively” either to Patolichev himself, or to one of his accompanying officials. A handwritten note commented that Whitlam did not raise the matter of Soviet Jewry during the official discussions, although he could have raised it informally with him. Later Whitlam did claim to have raised the matter.31

Senator Willesee mirrored Whitlam’s approach. When NSW Democratic Labor Party (DLP) representative, Senator John Kane, requested information about the situation of Soviet Jewry in 1973, Willesee referred to previous actions of the Australian Government and stressed the importance of fully implementing human rights commitments. He mentioned the fact that Australia had referred to Soviet Jewry at the UN Third Committee meetings in 1970 and 1971. Further, in a reply to a letter from Billy Snedden, Leader of the Liberal Opposition in January 1974, Willesee explained that the Government refrained from protesting directly to the Soviet Government, as this would be seen as interference in a domestic matter, and would just be an irritant to Australia’s relations with the Soviet Union. He felt that the only approach for Australia was to continue to raise the issue at the UN.32 When Senator Kane again raised the issue in regard to dancer Valery Panov, Willesee reiterated that there was nothing to be gained by direct representations.33

The 1973 Arab-Israeli war impacted on Soviet Jewish emigration. Initially the rate of immigration was not affected during the war, and for the three months after the war the numbers actually increased. However, the Arab countries pressured Austria to cease permitting Soviet emigrants to use Vienna as a transit point. Soviet Jewish émigrés had been staying for up to a week in Schoenau (a private house there) but, in response to Arab pressure, this time was reduced to 12 to 14 hours, in what was called a “waiting room” arrangement. The Australian Embassy in Vienna informed Canberra: “There can be little doubt that if it comes to the crunch even the waiting room arrangement will have to go if it represents the difference between Austria being branded as a friend of Israel or a neutral in the Middle East conflict”.34 The decision to close Shoenau led to Jewish demonstrations in Australia with protests made to the Australian and Austrian governments.35

As part of his radical changes in Australian foreign policy, Whitlam announced his intention to visit the Soviet Union. He had already travelled there as Leader of the Opposition. In preparation for his visit in November 1974, he met with V.P. Suslov, who was head of the Second European Department in the Soviet Foreign Ministry and was visiting Australia. Whitlam stressed his Government was working to overcome the phobia against the Soviet Union, which had been “manufactured” by the previous government. He also pointed out that one of the first acts in his foreign policy was to extend de jure recognition to the Soviet’s incorporation of the Baltic States of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia into the Soviet Union (Cumpston 1995). In regard to Soviet Jewry, Whitlam asked Suslov whether he could raise this issue during his visit. The Foreign Affairs Department memo of the meeting recorded:

7. Mr Suslov replied that emigration to Israel from the Soviet Union was now greater than at any time in the past. He said only a very limited number of persons were not permitted to leave and these were prevented for security reasons (e.g. persons connected with defence or missile production) or because they were criminals). Mr Suslov made it clear that there was no reason which would prevent the Prime Minister from raising this issue in Moscow, on the understanding that no statement should be made about any such discussion until after the Prime Minister’s departure from Moscow.36

Subsequently, Billy Snedden, the Leader of the Liberal Party Opposition, again raised the question of Soviet Jewry in Parliament. Whitlam replied that the Soviet Government was aware of Australia’s strong feelings on issues of human rights. He said he would consider raising this issue during his Moscow visit.37 At the same time, when questioned during a television interview, Whitlam in a disingenuous fashion, stated that during the visit of a very senior Soviet official (obviously a reference to Suslov), he mentioned that he wanted to raise the issue of Soviet Jewry during his visit and that, in answer to a question in Parliament, he had also replied positively. Whitlam concluded his comment: “You can certainly rely on it that I will use what influence we have, and we do have some, to mitigate the illiberal features of Soviet Rule”.38

While in the Soviet Union, Whitlam did raise the matter of Soviet Jewish emigration with Brezhnev and Kosygin, noting that whilst this was an internal matter, it did affect Australian/Soviet relations. Whitlam claimed that “further progress in this direction would assist the growth in the future of friendly and co-operative relations which exist between Australia and the Soviet Union”.39 As promised, nothing was publicised until Whitlam’s return to Australia in January 1975, when Whitlam reported on his discussions with Kosygin. He stated that he had referred to representations about the emigration of members of the Jewish and dissident communities, and about reunion of Soviet citizens with relatives in Australia. Kosygin referred to the increase of Jewish emigration in 1973 and 1974; he claimed that the number of applications was decreasing; and that in relation to reunion of relatives in Australia, each case would be dealt with on its merits. Whitlam also criticised the expulsion of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, which he said was against all international norms of human rights.40

In this period American Senator Henry (Scoop) Jackson and Representative Charles Vanik, both Democrats, co-sponsored an amendment in the two Houses of Congress, which would make permitting Jewish emigration to Israel a condition for the United States to grant the Soviet Union Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status. Both President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (himself Jewish), strongly opposed this proposal. In November 1974, the Australian Ambassador in Tel Aviv cabled to Canberra a report of a conversation between Kissinger and the Danish Ambassador in Tel Aviv, when Kissinger had referred to “that bastard Jackson”.41 The Jackson-Vanik amendment was passed, but the Soviets insisted that the issue of emigration was purely an internal affair, and that they would not respond to American pressure.42

Subsequently, negotiations between the Soviets and the Americans broke down and the numbers granted exit visas were halved. As part of a solidarity day for Soviet Jewry, the Israel Labor Party appealed to Whitlam, as the leader of the Australian Labor Party, to take action.43 In response, he wrote that the Labor Government was sympathetic to the issue of Soviet Jewry, but that the Soviet Government regarded this as an internal, domestic matter. He noted that he had raised the matter during his visit to the USSR in January and that: “You may be certain that the Australian Government will continue to use what influence it may have to mitigate the illiberal features of Soviet rule”.44

Trade Union Leader, Bob Hawke

In this period, ACTU leader Robert J. (Bob) Hawke emerged as a powerful advocate for both Soviet Jewry and Israel’s cause, and he was not afraid to mince words in his attack on Whitlam’s Middle East policies. Hawke’s strong support for Israel followed his selection as the first speaker for the Sam Cohen Memorial Lecture, which included a visit to Israel in 1971. When Hawke went to Israel he said he had “a general knowledge about Israel, but no particular interest.” His visit completely changed this. From the moment of his arrival, “Hawke and Israel were en rapport” and he established a deep emotional attachment for Israel and her people (D’Alpuget 1982: 249).

Hawke was also concerned with the plight of Soviet Jewry. When in Israel he met with Prime Minister Golda Meir, who asked him to fly to Moscow as an advocate for the right of Soviet Jews to emigrate. He consented and after an ILO meeting in Rome, he flew to Russia to meet with Alexander Shelepin, the president of the Soviet trade union Suzanne D. Rutland 51 movement, with whom he had established a close relationship. During their intense conversation at Shelepin’s Baltic Sea summer residence, he pressed the cause of Soviet Jewry. Subsequently, there was an increase in the number of Soviet Jews permitted to leave the Soviet Union. One Australian diplomat explained that the Soviets were so influenced by their own anti-Jewish propaganda about Jewish power, that they believed that Hawke was a representative of a “mighty and devious foe” (D’Alpuget 1982: 257). Hawke continued to be deeply involved with the issue of Soviet Jewry throughout the 1970s, and during his 1987 visit to the Soviet Union, he again presented their case to Party Secretary General, Mikhail Gorbachev, finally with positive results (D’Alpuget 2010: 215-216).

Hawke was highly critical of the Whitlam Government’s position on Israel during the Yom Kippur War. In an address to the Victorian Jewish Board of Deputies (VJBD) he stated that the present conflict needed more than a balanced view because:

When a nation of three million such as Israel is attacked on two fronts, on the most holy day of the Jewish Year by 350,000 troops and 4,000 tanks and thousands of planes, the concept of balance is merely a slogan which I cannot accept.45

Hawke’s attack on Whitlam received wide press coverage. On his return from a two-week overseas trip in November 1973, when he again visited Israel and met with Golda Meir, Hawke was even more emotional in his defence of Israel. He was highly critical of government policy claiming that it was a matter of “kow-towing based on the fear that oil supplies might be cut off”.46 Hawke made two deeply emotional appearances on television, on This Day Tonight and Mike Willesee’s program, A Current Affair, when he was literally on the verge of tears, especially when he spoke about the way Israeli prisoners of war had been shot by the Syrians.47 Again he confronted Whitlam’s policies, stating that to talk of “even-handedness in the Middle East dispute” was “an abuse of language” as the Arab States had aimed at eradicating Israel.48

The Australian Jewish Lobby

In the period from 1972 to 1975, Whitlam’s policies on Israel and the Middle East were a constant source of distress for Jewish communal leaders. For many Australian Jews, Whitlam’s policies created “a spreading sense of collective and personal insecurity amongst many Australian Jews who, for the first time, see their commitment to Israel questioned in ways which potentially threaten their acceptance in Australian society” (Lipski 1976: 16). The older members of the community had difficulty in reconciling this situation with the post-war ALP government, under Chifley and Evatt (Lipski 1976: 19).

Already in December 1972, shortly after his election, Whitlam was perceived as taking a position that was inimical to Israel’s position in relation to a UN vote. ECAJ president, Louis Klein, wrote to him and Whitlam changed the instructions of the Australian delegate at the United Nations, so that Australia abstained from voting in support of a resolution critical of Israel.49

Following Australia’s support of the UN resolution condemning Israel on 26 April 1973 in relation to Israel’s retaliation against the PLO in Lebanon for an attack on the Northern Israeli town of Kiryat Shmona, as discussed earlier, editor of the Australian Jewish Times, Eve Symon, strongly criticised the Australian vote, stressing that an abstention would have been better than a supportive vote. Given that Klein was the Times’ owner, this editorial voiced the community’s concern over Whitlam’s United Nations policy. In May 1973 Whitlam further upset the Jewish community when he addressed the twenty fifth Israeli Independence Day gathering and defended McIntrye’s vote. In response, Klein stated: “I believe we are facing a change in the Government’s attitude towards Israel”.50

In September 1973 Jewish leaders expressed concern when the Government decided to deport Abdul Hamid Abdullah Azzam, an Al- Fatah terrorist who had entered Australia illegally, rather than ensuring that he served the six months prison sentence which had been imposed by the courts. Klein argued that this decision was wrong “because it smacks of appeasement, it contradicts Australia’s justifiable outspoken advocacy of strong measures against international terror at the United Nations and other world forums; and because it undermines the authority of the National Government of Australia”.51

Approaches were made to Margaret Whitlam, Gough’s wife, to see if she could influence her husband. Gerda Urbach from Melbourne took up the cudgel supporting an international campaign for Professor Benjamin Levich, who had applied to emigrate from the Soviet Union Suzanne D. Rutland 53 but was refused and dismissed from his academic position. She wrote: “I know that your husband’s Government does not subscribe to the pernicious doctrine of non-interference in the affairs of sovereign states, e.g. in the case of apartheid in Rhodesia and South Africa, so I am sure that there will be no political objection to your support”.52 Mrs Whitlam passed this letter on to the Ministry who responded with their standard answer that the Prime Minister had publicly expressed his distaste for some of the repressive aspects to Soviet life, and that the Government had stressed the need to respect human rights, including the right to emigrate.

From early in 1973, ECAJ leaders sought to speak to Whitlam about what they perceived as a significant change of government policy, but without success. He finally agreed to meet with Louis Klein and Sam Lipski for one hour on 9 October 1973, on the fourth day of the 1973 war which had taken Israel by surprise, resulting in initial Egyptian successes. At that meeting, Whitlam stressed that the Government was not prepared to change its “even-handed policy” and he refused to call for a cease-fire or condemn the Egyptian attack. This response made the Jewish communal leaders angry and disturbed. On 3 November 1973, Bulletin journalist, Peter Samuel, commented on these tensions and argued that the reasons for the Government’s shift were “not difficult to discern.” They included Australia’s desire to create a foreign policy independent of the United States and to foster closer relations with the non-aligned countries by supporting pro-Arab resolutions in the United Nations. In addition, Australia was concerned with Arab oil and was influenced by the threats of a blockade.

This was the first time in its history that Australian Jewry had been faced with a government that was not sympathetic to Israel and Jewish communal leaders experienced a state of shock, especially after the 1973 war. Well-known Jewish scholar, Professor Geoffrey Wigoder, published an article in the Jerusalem Post entitled “Australian Policy tilts against Israel” on 13 March 1974. The Australian Ambassador in Israel, Rawdon Dalrymple, was very disturbed by this article and met with Wigoder for lunch to explain the Australian Government’s position.53 Dalrymple commented that he thought that either Isi Leibler or Nathan Jacobson had given the information to Wigoder. He added: “I thought he would find it interesting some time to have a talk to Mr Klein next time the latter was in Israel.” Clearly, Klein was seen as being more moderate than his Melbourne counterparts. Later Charlotte Jacobson, Chair of the World Zionist Organisation – American Section – visited Australia and wrote about the way the community had been shocked by Whitlam in an article published in the South African Jewish Times in July 1974.

Veteran ECAJ leader and Labor politician, Sydney Einfeld, also expressed his concerns in a telegram of protest to Whitlam. He stressed that he deeply resented the Australian abstentions, which he believed “directly opposes ALP declared policy on the preservation of Israeli sovereignty”. Whitlam defended his Government’s position at the United Nations, stating that Australia had not supported any of the anti-Israel resolutions which had been passed by a large majority. Australian Jewish leaders, through the ECAJ and the women’s organisations, strongly protested at the Australian position. When UNESCO voted to allow the PLO observer status, the ECAJ made representations to Willesee to follow the United States and cease its UNESCO funding, but the Government did not consent to this request. On the other hand, Australia strongly opposed attempts to expel Israel from the United Nations in August 1975. Jewish communal leaders also spoke out against the proposal to establish the Arab League office. Isi Leibler, VJBD president, argued that it was “an open invitation to terror in Australia”54 while ECAJ president, Louis Klein, wrote to the Minister expressing the community’s concerns.

All of these developments took place against the backdrop of continuing PLO terrorism, which further alarmed the Jewish community and widened the gulf between Whitlam, the Labor left and Australian Jewry. In April 1974 Israeli children were murdered at Ma’alot, resulting in a great sense of grief within the community. The ECAJ Annual Conference of March 1974 passed a resolution condemning the ongoing terrorism since the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre and this was forwarded to Whitlam after the Ma’alot tragedy.

Whitlam’s Middle East policies definitely led to an erosion of the traditional support for the Labor Party within the Jewish community. A high proportion of the Jewish community, particularly in Melbourne, were Labor voters (Medding 1968) and prominent Jews also provided significant funding for the ALP. Four Jewish Labor politicians were elected in December 1972 to the House of Representatives — Barry Cohen and Dr Richard “Dick” Klugman of New South Wales, Dr Moss Suzanne D. Rutland 55 Cass of Victoria and Joe Berinson of Perth. However, Dr Cass represented views of the socialist Labor left which were critical of Israel, and although Dr Klugman’s family had fled Austria following the Anschluss with Nazi Germany because they were Jews, Dr Klugman did not identify with the Jewish community. Two of Whitlam’s close advisers, Dr Peter Wilenski and Jim Spigelman were also Jewish, but as they were strong Whitlam supporters, they were not seen as speaking for the official Jewish community, and they themselves were often criticised by the established Jewish leadership.

In 1972 two non-Jewish Labor members were elected in seats with significant Jewish voters, Joan Child in Henty in Melbourne and Joe Riordan in the seat of Phillip in Bondi, New South Wales. As well, Clyde Holding was easily re-elected to the seat of Melbourne Ports. Over the years, Child, Riordan and Holding were active in advocating support both for Israel and for the campaign for Soviet Jewry. Child played a particularly impressive role in her strong support and ongoing efforts for oppressed Jews in the Soviet Union. She also visited Israel and remained a strong advocate of the Jewish state’s right to exist.

In May 1974 Whitlam called an early election. Members of the Labor Party in Melbourne were concerned about maintaining Jewish support, and asked communal figure Isador Magid to organise a meeting with Whitlam. Magid was one of the outstanding figures working for the United Israel Appeal and also a strong supporter of the ALP. Jewish funding support for the ALP had been significant over the years, with The Bulletin claiming in an article published after the meeting on 10 May 1974 that Jewish donations amounted to $20,000 for each election campaign, comprising about a fifth of the total funds raised by the ALP – Sam Lispki (1977: 21) quoted the figure of $30,000. Whilst these figures are “guestimates”, there was clearly a perception that Jewish financial support for the ALP was significant. Under pressure from Leibler, VJBD president, community leaders were also invited. A breakfast meeting took place at the Chevron Hotel where Whitlam addressed an audience of 120 people. The community leadership understood that the meeting was to be a confidential one, but Whitlam invited a journalist and photographer from the Melbourne Herald, stating that no such meeting could be confidential.

At this meeting, Whitlam stressed his support for Israel’s right to exist, but insisted on the need to withdraw to the pre-1967 borders.  He also compared Israeli retaliatory attacks on PLO bases in Lebanon with Arab terrorism:

There have been actions of a terrorist nature by Israel. Israel also has killed innocent people, women and children, maybe not so many. But there have also been crimes by the protagonists of Israel. I will condemn them too. The bullying of Lebanon by Israel gets no public support. Israeli civilian women and children, Lebanese women and children, are all sacred alike. I condemn the terrorist attacks which have brought shame on both.55

During the questions and answers, key community leaders were highly critical of the Government’s position in terms of its UN voting patterns, in relation to Palestinian terrorism from Lebanon, and the 1973 Day of Atonement War. In response to a statement by Nathan Jacobson, a key Melbourne Jewish leader, Whitlam claimed that elements within Israel had been “bullying Lebanon”, and that this contributed to the erosion of Israel’s position in the United Nations. There was considerable and acrimonious discussion of the UN resolution, which had condemned Israel’s incursion into Lebanon but made no reference to the second PLO attack on Kiryat Shmona in April 1974, when 18 Israeli citizens were killed. Whitlam tried to explain why Australia voted for the resolution, even though the amendment referring to Kiryat Shmona had been defeated. When questioned again, he made the statement that “You people are difficult to please”, a comment published in The Bulletin article. Prefacing his question, key community figure, Robert Zablud, stated that he hoped that Whitlam did not mean this in a derogatory fashion.56

The Melbourne Herald reporter published an account of the meeting, and the story was subsequently picked up by the wider media which reported on the “angry questioning” and heated barrage.57 In response, Leibler made a press statement on behalf of the VJBD that Whitlam’s approach was “disappointing and unacceptable” as he felt that Arab terrorism should not be equated with Israel’s right to self-defence. In an editorial, Symon stressed that the Jewish reaction to Whitlam’s comments at the meeting was not one of anger but rather one of “anxiety and concern about Israel”. She asserted: “We are not angry, nor do we have the influence to make or break a government, financially or otherwise, as suggested by some columnists. But we are very, very concerned”.58

Writing in The Age, Melbourne, on 22 May 1974 Creighton Burns commented that the ALP would have been better off if the breakfast meeting with the Jewish leaders had not been held, as Whitlam’s comments only distressed those present, not so much because of his policy as his style of speaking. Burns claimed: “He retains his unfortunate talent for causing the maximum irritation while achieving minimum benefit.” Leibler commented that “On every occasion I ever met and discussed Israel related issues with Whitlam, I sensed a brutal and undisguised personal animosity. But the Chevron meeting and the bitter intonation in his voice when he used the term ‘your people’ in response to a question, left me with no doubt that he was not merely critical of Israel but passionately despised the Jewish state and its Jewish supporters”.59 Indeed, the Jewish leadership recommended that members of the community should not vote for Whitlam. He maintained his openly critical position of the Jewish communal leadership in his public statements even following his defeat in the elections of December 1975. In his autobiography, Whitlam claimed that “the skilful work of successive Israeli diplomats is too often undermined by the crude blackmail of spokesmen and letter writers from the Jewish community” (Whitlam 1985: 126).

Whilst Whitlam was re-elected in 1974, albeit with a very slim majority, he suffered a major defeat in the elections following his Government’s dismissal by the Governor General, Sir John Kerr in 1975. Jewish support for the ALP dropped from between 75% to 67% in the 1940s to 30% in 1974 (Logan 1982: 2002). An indicator of Jewish voter discontent with ALP policies was that Joan Child lost her Victorian seat of Henty in December 1975 (Child 2010). Joe Riordan was also defeated in 1975 when Liberal candidate Jack Birney won the Sydney seat of Phillip. After his defeat, Whitlam continued to be critical not only of Israel but also of the local Jewish communal leadership. In 1980, for example, when the Jewish community conflicted with Hayden over his meeting with Arafat, Whitlam again accused the Jewish community of “crude political blackmail”.60 However, it is interesting to note that Hocking’s biography of Whitlam does not make any references to his relationship with the Jewish community, and her only reference to the 1973 Arab- Israeli war is in regard to its impact on the price of oil and the issue of the oil embargo (Hocking 2012: 115).

The Foreign Ministry bureaucracy at times also expressed annoyance with members of the Jewish community. In 1973, Rabbi Dr Israel Porush of the Great Synagogue wrote about the plight of a Russian rabbi, S.J. Shapira. A handwritten margin note commented: “Porush’s letter is about the limit. I don’t think we can really make representations to the Russians in regard to a case that has nothing at all to do with Australia. At the same time I don’t think we can appear to be unhelpful”.61 The departmental official suggested that they write to Rabbi Porush telling him to take up the case with his American contacts, and also suggested to send the letter on to the Australian Embassy in Moscow, to pass it on to the Dutch, but not to the Russians.62 Despite their initial annoyance with Porush, departmental officials did follow up and there was extended correspondence about ways to assist Rabbi Shapira.

The Arab Lobby

Whilst Whitlam clearly resented attempts by the Jewish community to lobby him, his reactions to efforts by the Arab community in Australia were very different. This was both due to what he perceived as their growing electoral significance (Whitlam 1985: 124), and his ideological stance of moving towards the Communist and Arab worlds. At a meeting with Jewish community leaders Whitlam stated:

The Jewish community, because of its education and its wealth and its cohesion has been able to make its point of view well understood. The Arab has not. I believe it would be wise for the Jewish community to realise that the Arab community is becoming more articulate. It is of no advantage to the Jewish Community for any condemnations of one side or another.63

He continued to stress the growing importance of the Arab community in Australia. When discussing his planned visit to the Soviet Union with Suslov in 1974, he referred to Jewish criticism of Soviet policies, but noted that “the gradual increase in the size of the Arab population in Australia meant that this pressure was being balanced”.64

Whitlam’s stance also reflected the shift in other social democratic parties in both Britain and France from support of Israel until 1967, to support for the Palestinian position, as enunciated by the PLO. In a study of policy change among left-wing parties, June Edmunds (2000) decided to focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict as a pertinent case study, due to the challenges socialist parties faced in regard to national issues (Edmunds 2000: 5). As she pointed out, during the 1970s: “The new left, which identified with Third World national liberation movements, began to adopt the Palestinian nationalist cause” (Edmunds 2000: 9). Thus, in moving towards supporting the position of third world countries, it was understandable that Whitlam assumed a more pro-Palestinian position and was more amenable to the Arab lobby.

Whitlam’s interest in interacting with the Arab community in Australia is shown clearly in his correspondence with Christian Lebanese businessman, Reuben F. Scarf, a key Arab lobbyist. Whitlam had developed a close relationship with Scarf through his electorate (Hocking 2012: 363). When the Labor Government refused visas to PLO representatives in early 1975, Scarf wrote to Whitlam and the Treasurer, Dr Jim Cairns, Opposition leader Billy Sneddon and his shadow Treasurer, and all the state premiers. In his letters, he stressed that Australian trade would suffer as a result of this decision and that Australia “stands to lose billions of dollars in trade with the Arab world”.65 The majority of the political leaders replied to Scarf that they were not prepared to accept PLO representatives until the organisation renounced terror and recognised Israel’s right to exist. In contrast, Whitlam replied that he believed that the Australian people should have the right to hear both sides:

I hope that it will soon be possible for the PLO to do so in Australia without producing the hysteria and social dissension which their recent invitation threatened to provoke. If the PLO wishes to send representatives to Australia, it should make the approach through Australian diplomatic posts and not through a self-appointed spokesman like Mr Hartley.66

Scarf replied, endorsing Whitlam’s hope that the PLO will soon be able to visit Australia, without “producing hysteria”, which, he claimed, was “whipped up by the Zionist propagandists”.67 Scarf also took Whitlam’s hint, and organised through the correct diplomatic channels for Gamal Omar El-Surani, director of an Arab League office in Cairo, who was also a member of the PLO, to visit Australia in June 1975, sponsored by the Arab League. This decision was made when Dr Cairns was acting Prime Minister, but was supported by Whitlam who later replied in Parliament that he would be prepared to meet El-Surani, because he was “prepared to learn [from] opposing points of view”.68

Faced with a fait accompli, the Jewish leadership decided that the best way to deal with the visit was a low-keyed approach, although President of the ECAJ, Nathan Jacobson, did write a strong letter of protest.69 Barry Cohen, ALP MHR, warned the Jewish community that they would “hurt their cause if they protested”.70 In an editorial on 15 May 1975, Symon advocated a quiet information campaign rather than mass demonstrations. She stressed that: “Politics is the art of the possible and if we think that Mr Whitlam can be induced into changing his mind, we may be fooling ourselves.” The Jewish leadership felt that their policy had been successful as there was little media coverage of El-Surani’s visit and four state premiers refused to meet with him.71 The same policy was followed with the visit of roving Arab League Ambassador, Lebanese journalist and PLO supporter, Dr Clovis Maksoud.

Whitlam’s tendency to lean towards the Arabs in diplomatic policy was also seen in other interventions on behalf of Arab interests and against Israel. Peter Samuel of The Bulletin described two examples of such activities in an article published on 6 March 1976. The first took place around April 1974 when a local finance company teamed up with one of the Arab Gulf States in a move to buy a major office block development in downtown Sydney. This scheme involved more than $10 million and was regarded by the Treasury as running counter to policy on foreign ownership of Australian real estate but Dr Cairns, reportedly with Whitlam’s blessing, approved the plans. Later in that year the navy put out tenders for a new series of patrol boats for the Australian fleet but a senior Foreign Affairs official was reported to have told the Israelis that “it would be no use their tendering because the Australian Government would not buy Israeli ships, even if they were the best, because of the Government’s Middle East policy.” Samuel was highly critical of government policy in both cases, which for different reasons failed to be implemented.

The efforts by the ALP to develop links with the Arab world in terms of trade, diplomatic relations and other financial dealings were highlighted by what became known as the “Iraqi loans scandal” when Rex Connor, the Minister for Minerals and Energy, attempted to raise a loan from Middle Eastern countries for energy resources, working with businessman Tirath Khemlani, without going through the legal avenues. This scheme was revealed in July 1975, following a leak. Before the December 1975 election, the Whitlam team sought to raise Suzanne D. Rutland 61 funds from Iraq, in what became known as “the Iraqi Money Affair,” negotiated by left-winger Bill Hartley and an unscrupulous businessman, Henry (also Henri) John Fischer. Owing to widespread dissatisfaction with the ALP, it was facing a severe funding shortage for the election. Hartley devised a scheme to ask the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein to lend funds to the ALP. Whitlam supported the proposal and suggested that Hartley approach the Scarf Foundation, established to promote trade between Australia and the Arab countries. Hartley decided to enlist Fischer to assist him in the negotiations (Hocking 2012: 363). Fischer was a former Scarf employee from 1972-1975, when he worked as a trouble-shooter for Australian trade in the Middle East, and Whitlam supported this decision, one that Hocking described as “a dreadfully flawed judgement on so many levels, perhaps best understood through the prism of shock and despair that characterised the months after the dismissal” (Hocking 2012: 364).

Whitlam met with two Iraqi officials at Fischer’s apartment on 10 December 1975, a few days before the election. He told them that his dismissal was a “coup dʼetat” and that the ALP needed a million dollars to cover advertising costs spent on the forthcoming election. After Labor’s defeat, these negotiations came out into the open in February 1976.72 Scarf himself denied any involvement in these negotiations. He had become a Liberal supporter, although he still donated to the ALP.

Fischer later reported:

The whole conversation [in my apartment] lasted for approximately 1 hour and contained many statements by all parties on Imperialism and Zionist pressures and Mr Whitlam said the Jewish pressures were enormous in Australia and the Iraqis must understand what the democratic forces in Australia were going through to withstand these pressures.73

In his statement, Fischer explained three main points were agreed to:

1. The securing of an assurance that Australia would have “a more even-handed policy in the Middle East”.
2. A request for special information about what was going on in Title 62 the Middle East between the United States, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt and Jordan.
3. Lastly, they sought, and received, an assurance that Mr Hawke would not become leader of the Labor Party.74

Thus, due to his ideological sympathy with the Palestinians, his belief in the growing power of the Arab vote in Australia and his desire to create closer ties with the Communist and Arab worlds, Whitlam responded sympathetically to Arab lobbying, unlike his response to the Jewish lobby.

Conclusion

This analysis of Whitlam’s policies on Israel and Soviet Jewry, the two major issues facing the Jewish world in the 1970s, demonstrates that he did implement a major shift in Australia’s foreign policy, because of his overall philosophy in terms of the Cold War, his support for the developing world, his opposition to colonialism, and his belief in internationalism and the importance of the United Nations. His rapprochement with the Communist world occurred at a time of increasing détente between the United States and the Soviet Union during Nixon’s presidency. Yet, unlike Whitlam, Nixon supported Israel during the 1973 war and the American Congress passed the Jackson- Vanik Amendment, connecting the most-favoured nation status with the granting of freedom of emigration to Soviet Jewry in 1974, something that the Soviets refused to accept.

Whitlam’s turn away from support of Israel and Soviet Jewry was the result of a number of complex factors, which included pragmatism, given the growing number of Arab immigrants to Australia; his efforts to realign Australia with the Third World countries; the influence of Hartley and the left; and the financial pressures which led to the Iraqi loan affair. As noted above, in response to Whitlam’s position on the 1973 war, the Jewish leadership took a partisan stance in the 1974 elections – the only time a recommendation has been made not to vote for a mainstream party. Thus, it can be claimed that Whitlam introduced a major sea-change in Australian policy, resulting in the period of his leadership being seen as the “nadir” in the relationship between the ALP and the Australian Jewish community (Encel 2004: 59).

The Jewish community responded to this sea-change by attempting to pressure Whitlam, but their efforts were counter-productive. During his diplomatic meetings with the Soviets, and in communication with Arab Australians, Whitlam openly expressed his antipathy to the Jewish lobby, and he also referred to this in his memoir of the period (Whitlam 1985: 124-126). Given Whitlam’s worldview, it is difficult to say whether a more low-keyed approach on behalf of Jewish community leaders would have achieved better results.

Whilst Pemberton argues that Whitlam’s foreign policy approach was in keeping with the Labor tradition, largely established by Evatt, the Jewish community saw Whitlam’s approach in regard to Israel and world Jewry as a significant break from Evatt’s position. However, the differences were more a result of the changing contexts between the 1940s and the 1970s in the left’s perceptions of the Jewish state, rather than different approaches to foreign policy. Whilst in the 1940s Evatt was motivated by strong humanitarian concerns following the Holocaust, as a result of Israel’s 1967 victory and occupation of the conquered territories, in the 1970s the Palestinians were seen as the victims, a position held strongly by Whitlam, who emerged as a supporter of the PLO and a strong critic of Israeli government policies. Thus, although both Evatt and Whitlam believed in the importance of Australia forging an independent foreign policy, supporting internationalism and the United Nations, their positions on Israel as the state for the Jewish people were different, due to the different context created by the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

Endnotes

1. These were the initials of the President, Lyndon Baines Johnson.
2. NAA: A1838 69/1/17, Part 5, 14 April 1974.
3. Emailed comment from Rawdon Dalrymple, 4 October 2012.
4. IJLA: 794.1/370 Vol 1, 9 May 1974.
5. Australian Jewish Times (AJT), 2 August 1973.
6. IJLA: 2422 [1960-1987] and 2423A [1952-1973], Notes of Isi Leibler’s address to the VJBD, 22 October 1973.
7. CPD: 18 October 1973, in IJLA: Vol 78.
8. 8 November 1973, IJLA: Vol 78.
9. The Sun, and The Age, 6 December 1973.
10. AJT, 17 October 1974.
11. NAA: ‘Australia Israel Relations’, A1838/272 1175/10/1 Part 12. This letter was forwarded on by Michael Elizur, Israeli Ambassador to Australia, 22 October 1974.
12. AJT, 19 December 1974. Whitlamʼs Shifts in Foreign Policy 1972 –1975 64
13. ECAJ Annual Report, 1975.
14. Herald, Melbourne, and News, 11 July 1974.
15. IJLA: Vol 78, 21 June-25 July 1974.
16. SMH, Examiner, 3 July 1974 and AJT, 11 July 1974.
17. NAA: A1838/2, 175/10/15, 12 June 1974.
18. Courier Mail, 27 January 1975.
19. ECAJ Annual Report, 1975.
20. NAA: 1838/272, Item: 175/10/1/ Part 12, confidential memo, no date, no signature, around mid-1974.

21.NAA: 1838/272, Item: 175/10/1/ Part 12, confidential memo.

22. NAA: 1838/272, Item: 175/10/1/ Part 12, confidential memo.
23. IJLA: “Soviet Jewry”, 1 September 1970.
24. IJLA: “Soviet Jewry”, 1 September 1970.
25. NAA: A1838/272 1175/10/1 Part 12, 10 February 1973.
26. NAA: A1838/272 1175/10/1 Part 12, 18 January 1973.
27. NAA: A1838/272 1175/10/1 Part 12, 11 December 1973.
28. NAA: A1838/272 1175/10/1 Part 12, notes by Cooper, p.222.
29. NAA: A1838/272 1175/10/1 Part 12, 13 March 1973.
30. NAA: A1838/272 1175/10/1 Part 12, 6 April 1973.
31. NAA: A1838/272 1175/10/1 Part 12, 15 and 22 March 1973.
32. NAA: A1838/272 1175/10/1 Part 12, 25 January 1974.
33. NAA: A1838/272 1175/10/1 Part 12, 28 February 1974.
34. NAA: A1838/272 1175/10/1 Part 12, 7 November 1973.
35. ECAJ Annual Conference 1973/1974.
36. NAA: A1838/272 1175/10/1 Part 13, draft document, p.55.
37. NAA: A1838/272 1175/10/1 Part 13, draft document, p.55.
38. NAA: A1838/272 1175/10/1 Part 13, Report, 3 December 1974, p.68.
39. NAA: A1838/272 1175/10/1 Part 13, memo “For Publication on my Return”, p.84.
40. NAA: 1838 69/2/8/2, Part 1, “Terrigal Conference: ‘The Soviet Union: Jewish Emigration, Political Prisoners, Dissidents’”, February 1975.
41. NAA: A1838/272 1175/10/1 Part 13, 12 November 1974.
42. NAA: A1838/272 1175/10/1 Part 13, 19 December 1974.
43. NAA: A1838/272 1175/10/1 Part 13, 13 April 1975.
44. NAA: A1838/272 1175/10/1 Part 13, outward cablegram to Moscow, 3 December 1974, p.68.
45. The Age, 10 November 1973.
46. The Australian, 26 November 1973.
47. Cable to Isi Leibler, with a typewritten transcript of the article in The Australian, 26 November 1973 and a brief report of Hawke’s television interviews, as well as media arrangements for Leibler on his return from overseas.
48. The Australian, 27 November 1973.
49. AAJ: ECAJ, 20 December 1972.
50. AJN, “Govt Cooling to Israel”, 11 May 1973.
51. SLV: Boxes 76 and 105.
52. NAA: A1838/272 1175/10/1 Part 13, 20 August 1973.
53. NAA: 1838/272, 175/10/1/, Part 12, 22 March 1974.
54. Morning Herald and Telegraph, 12 July 1974.
55. IJLA: “Australian Jewry”, ALP, Jews and Israel”, Vol 78, 9 May 1974.
56. IJLA: “Australian Jewry”, ALP, Jews and Israel”, Vol 78, 9 May 1974, p.13.
57. Examiner, The Age, 10 May 1974, Sunday Telegraph, 12 May 1974.
58. AJT, 16 May 1974.
59. Leibler, email communication: 2 September 2012.
60. ECAJ Annual Report 1980.
61. NAA: 1838/272, Item: 175/10/1/ Part 12, 5 March 1973.
62. NAA: 1838/272, Item: 175/10/1/ Part 12, 5 March 1973.
63. IJLA: “Australian Jewry”, ALP, Jews and Israel”, Vol 78, 9 May 1974.
64. NAA: 1838/272, Item: 175/10/1/ Part 13, November 1973.
65. IJLA: “ALP, Jews and Israel,” 13 February 1975.
66. IJLA: “ALP, Jews and Israel,” 18 February 1975.
67. IJLA: “ALP, Jews and Israel”, February 1975.
68. Herald, Melbourne, 14 May 1975.
69. IJLA: “ALP, Israel and the Jews,” 12 May 1975.
70. The Age, 15 May 1975.
71. ECAJ Com Meeting, 25 June 1975.
72. Philip Dorling, “How Murdoch got his biggest scoop”, Sydney Morning Herald, 19 November 2011, http://www.smh.com.au/national/how-murdoch-got-his-biggestscoop- 20111118-1nnar.html,accessed 19 November 2011
73. Roughly typed 40-page statement with pen-mark ups from Henry John Fischer, aged 38, Department of the Senate, 28 April 1976, paper tabled. IJLA: ‘ALP, Jews and Israel’, p.33.
74. IJLA: Fischer statement, “ALP, Jews and Israel,” p.34.

References

Archives Archive of Australian Judaica, Fisher Library, Sydney (AAJ). Isi Joseph Leibler Archive, Jerusalem (IJLA).

La Trobe Section, State Library of Victoria, Melbourne (SLV).

National Archives of Australia, Canberra (NAA)

Interviews

Michael Elizur, Israeli Ambassador to Australia, 1973 – 1979, and 1983, Jerusalem, November 2000.

Joan Child, ALP Member of the House of Representatives, Melbourne, August 2010.

Newspaper Articles

Australian Jewish Times (AJT), 1972-1975.

Peter Samuel, “Jewish leaders attack Whitlam”. The Bulletin, 3 November 1973.

“Peace Vital for Israel – PM to Jews”. The Herald, Melbourne, 9 May 1974.

“Snap, crackle, pop”. The Bulletin, Sydney, 10 May 1974.

“Whitlam counters Jewish barrage”. Examiner, Launceston, 10 May 1974.

“Jewish leaders rap PM”. The Age, 10 May 1974.

“Angry Jews Turn Against Whitlam”. Sunday Telegraph, Sydney, 12 May 1974.

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